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Abstract. Hamilton’s rule explains when natural selection will favor altruism between conspecifics, given their degree
of relatedness. In practice, indicators of relatedness (such as scent) coevolve with strategies based on these indicators,
a fact not included in previous theories of kin recognition. Using a combination of simulation modeling and mathe-
matical extension of Hamilton’s rule, we demonstrate how altruism can emerge and be sustained in a coevolutionary
setting where relatedness depends on an individual’s social environment and varies from one locus to another. The
results support a very general expectation of widespread, and not necessarily weak, conditional altruism in nature.
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Hamilton’s rule states that natural selection will favor al-
truism between conspecifics when rb 2 c . 0, where r is
their genetic relatedness, b is the benefit to the recipient, and
c is the cost to the donor (Hamilton 1964). In practice, in-
dicators of relatedness (such as scent) coevolve with strat-
egies based on these indicators, a fact not included in previous
theories of kin recognition (Crozier 1986; Reeve 1989; Rat-
nieks 1991; Agrawal 2001; Lehmann and Perrin 2002). We
show with an evolutionary model how contingent altruism
can be sustained even when arbitrary heritable indicators of
relatedness, called ‘‘tags’’, coevolve with the strategies gov-
erning behavior. Discrimination based on tags is not assumed,
but rather evolves endogenously in a viscous population (i.e.,
local reproduction and local interaction) and is selected for
even when phenotypic matching is very coarse-grained. We
also show how to extend Hamilton’s rule to establish the
conditions under which kin recognition can support discrim-
inating altruism even when coevolution causes the reliability
of indicators of relatedness to vary with each individual’s
evolving social environment. This multitrait extension re-
quires the calculation of different relatednesses for different
traits. The simulation and the mathematical analysis show
how discriminatory altruism can evolve in realistic settings
where assessment of relatedness is based on weak and po-
tentially deceptive indicators.
To explore the evolution of tag-based altruism, our model
embodies three mechanisms. To allow altruism, but not direct
reciprocity, fitness is determined by neighbors interacting in
a one-move prisoner’s dilemma. To allow behavior that is
conditioned on indicators of relatedness, strategies can take
account of observable tags, such as scent. Tags differ from
signals (Spence 1974; Grafen 1990) by being inflexible ex-
pressions of an individual’s genotype rather than subject to
individual control (Hochberg et al. 2003). To allow com-
petition for scarce resources, the population is viscous, and
the population size is fixed. Because the tags and strategies
are not linked, the model allows for the possibility of ‘‘cheat-
ers’’ who can be free riders in the group whose tag they
carry. The resulting agent-based model is based on a model
previously developed to study ethnocentrism in humans (Ax-
elrod and Hammond 2003). The present model is not meant
to be a literal representation of biological processes. Instead,
our model is designed to illuminate the consequences of the
fact that kin discrimination typically entails coevolution of
three things: the strategies governing behavior, the reliability
of the tags on which the behavior may be conditioned, and
the population structure that determines who interacts with
whom.
The model is very simple. An individual agent has three
traits, each a haploid genetic locus. The first trait is a tag
that can be one of four observable types, such as scents. The
second and third traits specify the agent’s strategy. The sec-
ond trait has two alleles to specify whether the agent co-
operates or defects (i.e., is altruistic or selfish) when meeting
an individual of its own scent. Likewise, the third trait spec-
ifies whether the agent cooperates or defects when meeting
an agent of a different scent. For example, the discriminatory
strategy is cooperation with agents of one’s own scent and
defection with others. In this model, the discriminatory strat-
egy is only one of four possible strategies.
The simulation begins with a population of 2000 individ-
uals (with random genotypes) each placed at random in its
own site on a 50 3 50 lattice. The space has wrap-around
borders so that each site has exactly four neighboring sites.
Each period consists of two stages: interaction and repro-
duction.
In stage 1, each agent in the population receives an initial
value of 0.12 as its potential to reproduce (PTR). Each pair
of adjacent agents interacts in a one-move prisoner’s dilemma
in which each player independently chooses whether or not
to help the other. Giving help has a cost, namely a decrease
in the agent’s PTR by 0.01. Receiving help has a benefit,
namely an increase in the agent’s PTR by 0.03.
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TABLE 1. Robustness of the simulation model. The data are averaged over the last 100 iterations of the 30 replications of each variant.
The base case parameter settings are: cost (c) 5 0.01, benefit (b) 5 0.03, number of colors 5 4, mutation rate 5 0.001, lattice size 5
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TABLE 2. Effects of variation in proportion of vacant space. The less crowded the environment, the closer the offspring can be placed
to their parents, resulting in higher levels of cooperation. Conversely, the more crowded the space, the further the offspring tend to be
from their parents, and the more the results resemble the case of completely random placement. The data are averaged over the last 100




















































In stage 2, each agent is given a chance to reproduce asex-
ually with probability equal to its PTR. An offspring receives
the traits of its parent, with a mutation rate of 0.001 per trait.
The expanded population of adults and infants is then culled
at random to bring it back to its original size of 2000. The
surviving offspring are then placed as close as possible to
their parent’s cell. Placement starts with orphans who are
placed in their deceased parent’s cell. Next to be placed are
offspring who can find an empty cell adjacent to their sur-
viving parent, and so on for increasing distances from the
parent. (Distance is measured by ‘‘city-blocks.’’)
The simulation results show that contingent altruism
evolves even though there is no explicit bias for it in the
model. Averaging over the final 100 periods of 30 2000-
period runs, 76.6% of the agents have the discriminatory
strategy. This high rate of discriminatory altruism results in
91.6% of same tag interactions being cooperative, and 82.7%
of different tag interactions being noncooperative.
Notice that the model allows for deception by egoists who
defect against everyone. In a region of discriminators of a
certain scent, a lone egoist of the same scent will receive
donations from its neighbors without itself donating. Ana-
lyzing the dynamics of the simulation reveals how contingent
altruism suppresses egoists. A successful agent and its off-
spring quickly form a more or less coherent region. Consider
what happens when an agent belonging to a region of dis-
criminatory agents with a common tag interacts with an agent
belonging to a region of, for example, egoists of a different
scent. In this case, the discriminatory agent will do better
overall because it gets help from other agents in its own
region, while the egoist gets no help from other agents in its
own region. The result is that a region of discriminators will
tend to expand at the expense of an adjacent region of egoists
of a different scent. In fact, a region of discriminators will
tend to expand at the expense of a region of a different scent
that uses any one of the three other strategies. In this way,
discriminators of one scent hold egoists of other scents in
check. Since the tag (scent) locus does not go to fixation,
egoism is controlled. (A Quicktime movie at umich.edu/
;axe/AHG/ illustrates the spatial dynamics of the simula-
tion.)
The success of contingent altruism is robust under a wide
range of parameters. When any of the following parameters
are either halved or doubled, at least 63% of strategies are
discriminatory and at least 68% of the choices are cooper-
ative: lattice width, number of alleles on the tag locus, mu-
tation rate, or duration of the run (Table 1). Changes in the
size of the population relative to the lattice size also have
minimal effect. For example, halving the proportion of empty
space leads to an increase in the average distance between
parents and their offspring, thereby weakening localism as a
signal of relatedness. Even in this case, 58% of the agents
use the discriminatory strategy, and 60% of the behavior is
cooperative (Table 2). The simulation results are also not
very sensitive to the possibility that an agent will occasionally
misperceive whether or not the other agent in the interaction
has the same scent. Even when agents make this mistake 10%
of the time, the proportion of discriminatory strategy, level
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FIG. 1. Effect of variation in benefit/cost ratio. The benefit param-
eter (b) is systematically varied from 0.01 to 0.10 by increments
of 0.01, with the cost parameter held constant at c 5 0.01. The
strategy distribution data are averaged over the last 100 iterations
of the 30 replications of each variant.
of contingent altruism, and the overall level of cooperation
all remain over 75%.
Thus, contingent altruism evolving from local reproduction
and local interaction can support cooperation, even when the
interactions are one-move prisoner’s dilemma games. Indeed,
some localism in both reproduction and interaction is nec-
essary: if the simulation is run with either random placement
of offspring or random interaction, less than 2% of the strat-
egies are discriminatory and less than 1% of the interactions
are cooperative. (The small amounts of cooperation are due
to mutation-selection balance.) Even with localism, cooper-
ation requires a sufficiently high ratio of benefit to cost. When
the benefit is no greater than the cost, cooperation fails and
the egoist strategy is dominant; but as the benefit/cost ratio
increases, egoism gives way to altruism (Fig. 1).
A remarkable result of the simulation model is that dis-
crimination based on an unreliable and potentially deceptive
indicator of kinship can actually increase the total amount of
cooperation in the population. As we have seen, when four
alleles of the tag locus could be distinguished, 91.0% of all
interactions were cooperative. In contrast, when all tags look
alike, the rate of cooperation falls to 15.6%.
In this simulation, the indicator of relatedness evolves sep-
arately from the genes that control behavior, making the in-
dicator potentially deceptive. Moreover, the indicator’s re-
liability can vary throughout the population because repro-
duction and interaction are local. This variability is repre-
sentative of an important class of biological reality. Previous
models of altruism have assumed fixed relatednesses (Reeve
1989; Agrawal 2001; Lehmann and Perrin 2002), or fixed
levels of altruism (Crozier 1986; Ratnieks 1991). We now
show how to extend Hamilton’s rule (henceforth HR) to cover
coevolving traits and variably reliable indicators of related-
ness, accounting for the evolution of contingent altruism un-
der these very general conditions.
We begin by analyzing the social environment of the in-
dividual, defining the following variables: m is one if there
is a match (same tag) between two interacting individuals
and zero if there is not; Am is one if the individual is altruistic
toward a neighbor of type m and zero if not; is the averageA9m
Am of neighbors, and Nm is the number of neighbors of type
m. For example, A1 5 1 indicates altruism toward matching
neighbors, and A0 5 1 indicates altruism toward nonmatching
neighbors. With these definitions, the individual’s PTR is
9 9P 5 a 1 b(A N 1 A N ) 2 c(A N 1 A N ), (1)1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
where a is the initial PTR before social interaction. In the
simulation, a 5 0.12, b 5 0.03, and c 5 0.01. With hard
selection, relative fitness is W 5 (1 1 P)/(1 1 P̄), where P̄
is the average P over the entire population for the period in
question. Following Queller (1992), we substitute this for-
mula for W into the population genetic Price equation (Price
1970) with perfect transmission
DE[A ] 5 cov(A , W)m m (2)
and obtain an expression for the expected change in the mean
of Am before mutation
9 9kDE [A ] 5 b[cov(A , A N ) 1 cov(A , A N )]m m 1 1 m 0 0
2 c[cov(A , A N ) 1 cov(A , A N )], (3)m 1 1 m 0 0
where k 5 1 1 P̄.
HR has been shown to apply (Grafen 1985) if r is measured
in terms of genetic similarity rather than kinship, where ge-
netic similarity at a single locus, for a given allele (whose
frequency is p), is defined as:
H (R 2 p)O j j
j
r 5 , (4)
H (D 2 p)O j j
j
where Dj and Rj are the potential donor and potential recip-
ient’s genotype at that locus, and Hj equals one if a donation
was made on the jth occasion on which a donation might be
made and zero otherwise.
We now extend this analysis and add subscripts to define
rmn, a relatedness at a locus m in relation to donations caused
by locus n, to provide a two-locus (or as we shall see later
more generally a two-trait) version of HR. Each directed pair
of neighbors will be considered an occasion and indexed by
j. Hnj is defined as one if an altruistic act is made through
locus n on occasion j, Rmj as one if the recipient on occasion
j has the Am 5 1 allele, and Dmj as one if the potential donor
on occasion j has the Am 5 1 allele; and each variable is zero
otherwise. The generalization of r is
H (R 2 p )O nj mj m
j
r 5 . (5)mn
H (D 2 p )O nj mj m
j
We now show how this formula can be used to analyze
the forces of selection. Let Smj equal one if a donation would
be made if the donor had allele Am 5 1 and zero otherwise,
so that S1j 5 1 if the pair have the same tag, and S0j 5 1 if
the pair have different tags. Noting that Hmj 5 DmjSmj, we
obtain the following identities:
H 5 D S 5 R S , (6a)O O Onj nj nj nj nj
j j j
H R 5 D R S , and (6b)O Onj mj mj nj nj
j j
H D 5 D D S , (6c)O Onj mj mj nj nj
j j
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where we have sometimes reversed the role of donor and
recipient, Dj and Rj. Such a reversal merely changes the order
of the summation. It does not change the corresponding Snj
because reversing roles does not affect whether two given
individuals match on a specific locus. These identities allow
us to show that
D R S 2 p R SO Omj nj nj m nj nj
j j
r 5mn
D D S 2 p D SO Omj nj nj m nj nj
j j
9 9 9E [A A N ] 2 E [A ]E [A N ] cov(A , A N )m n n m n n m n n5 5 . (7)
E [A A N ] 2 E [A ]E [A N ] cov(A , A N )m n n m n n m n n
Geometrically, rmn is the regression coefficient of onA9m
Am, using only data from directed pairs where a donation is
caused by locus n; but forcing the line to pass through the
point E [Am], E[Am] (Grafen 1985). The same approach de-
fines a cross-locus regression that measures linkage disequi-
libria
H (D 2 p )O nj mj m cov(A , A N )j m n nb 5 5 . (8)mn cov(A , A N )H (D 2 p )O n n nnj nj n
j
This is the slope of Am on An among individuals that make
a donation caused by locus n, forcing the line to pass through
the point E[An], E[Am].
Equation (3) can now be rewritten, assuming n is the other
strategy locus from m, as
kDE [A ] 5 cov(A , A N )(r b 2 c)m m m m mm
1 cov(A , A N )b (r b 2 c), (9)n n n mn mn
and we immediately interpret terms as direct selection of Am
5 cov(Am,AmNm)(rmmb 2 c), opportunity-weighted variation
at Am 5 cov(Am,AmNm), HR term for Am over donations con-
trolled by locus m 5 rmmb 2 c, indirect selection via An 5
cov(An,AnNn)bmn(rmnb 2 c), opportunity-weighted variation
at An 5 cov(An,AnNn), linkage disequilibrium with An 5 bmn,
and HR term for Am over donations controlled by locus n 5
rmnb 2 c.
The generalization of HR in equation (9) directs a biolog-
ical interpretation of the simulation results. Each term can
be calculated from each period of the simulation data to pro-
vide a numerical analysis of selection over time, and the
analysis is exact in expectation apart from the effects of mu-
tation. To obtain an exact analysis, the relatednesses have
been specially constructed, and they measure genetic simi-
larity and not coancestry. This is the first version of HR to
consider two traits simultaneously. We now turn to the in-
terpretation.
First, it turns out that indirect selection is small enough to
be neglected compared to direct selection. Thus, whether se-
lection favors altruism toward matching neighbors (A1 5 1)
depends on the sign of the HR term r11 b 2 c, and whether
selection favors altruism toward nonmatching neighbors (A0
5 1) depends on the sign of the HR term r00 b 2 c. Inequality
between the two relatednesses is necessary to achieve r11b
2 c . 0 . r00b 2 c, the condition for selection for discrim-
ination.
This focuses attention on the relatednesses, r11 and r00.
They can be compared to a third measure of relatedness based
on the tag locus, say rt. The ordering of relative relatedness
is r11 . rt . r00, numerically after 2000 periods in the stan-
dard case, 0.328 (60.014) . 0.222 (60.036) . 20.047
(60.074), where the standard errors derive from 30 repli-
cations of the simulation. The explanation is as follows. The
relatednesses are measured over the opportunities for action,
so r11 is measured between same-tag neighbors while r00 is
measured between different tag neighbors. Within the rela-
tively stable blocks composed of the same tag, neighbors are
likely to share much recent common ancestry. By contrast,
different tag neighbors are likely to descend from different
tag parents, on either side of a tag-boundary, except in the
relatively rare instances of recent mutation at the tag locus.
This difference between relatednesses allows the evolution
of discriminating altruism.
The time course of development of the relatednesses is
also of interest. Unlike the analytical relatednesses employed
by Taylor and Irwin (2000), our relatednesses, like those of
Hamilton (1964), are statistical within the model, and so do
not rely on an assumption of weak selection. Their statistical
nature does mean that the mechanisms underlying them need
to be studied. As the simulations begin with randomly placed
random genotypes, both relatednesses begin at zero. After 25
generations, r11 has climbed to 0.626 (60.006) while r00 still
remains near zero: clusters of same-tagged individuals are
forming so that same-tag neighbors share common ancestry,
while opposite-tag neighbors do not. This value of r11, if
sustained, would result in A1 5 1 going very close to fixation.
However, as noted above, by 2000 generations, r11 has fallen
to 0.328 (60.013), around the value of c/b, stabilizing the
frequency of A1 5 1. This fall must arise from the increased
size of the same-tag clusters. The parents of same-tag neigh-
bors may now be some distance away, even if in the same
cluster. Furthermore, individuals on the inside of clusters
have the highest fitness as they benefit most from altruism.
Thus, there is higher pressure of offspring within a cluster
to fill the gaps caused by culling than on its boundary. Large
clusters have relatively larger insides, and so their offspring
will on average be placed further from parents than in small
clusters, and so reduce neighbor-neighbor relatednesses. This
effect of cluster-size on relatedness has a negative feedback
effect and holds the population back from complete same-
tag altruism.
There is an important extension not required for the sim-
ulations but that adds to the importance of the analysis of
selection presented here. Provided the expected fitness is lin-
ear in the variables Am, we can relax the requirement that A1
and A0 are each determined by a single haploid locus. Instead,
A can be any p-score (Grafen 1985). Thus, there can be any
number of alleles at the locus, specifying arbitrary numerical
values for A. The population could be diploid (or more gen-
erally polyploid), provided the value of A is obtained by
adding the numerical values of the alleles present. A could
even be determined by summing numerical values from the
alleles present at more than one locus, provided all the loci
have the same inheritance pattern. The analysis of selection
retains exactly the same form, and the interpretations of the
terms as regression coefficients of relatedness, regression
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measures of genetic covariance, and measures of genetic var-
iation, remain the same. Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000) study
simulations that also have local competition and limited dis-
persal, and introduce noninclusive fitness arguments to sup-
plement the original form of HR. In contrast, our analysis
generalizes HR, and so incorporates the effects of local com-
petition and dispersal into the overall framework of inclusive
fitness, thus preserving the one conceptual framework with
the capacity to embrace all work on selection of social traits.
The algebraic method above is the first published analysis
of selection for kin recognition with simultaneous variation
at the indicator and altruistic loci. This method helps us un-
derstand the conditions under which kin recognition can sup-
port discriminating altruism even when the reliability of in-
dicators of kinship depends on the individual’s social envi-
ronment. The simulation was specially designed to make net
fitness linear in the values of the altruistic loci, so that benefits
and costs of altruism in the algebraic analysis can be cal-
culated directly from the specification of the simulation. The
analytical approach can be applied in simulations with non-
linear fitnesses by following Queller (1992) in obtaining
‘‘empirical’’ estimates of b and c from a linearized fitness
function.
The value of being able to distinguish tags can be under-
stood in terms of inclusive fitness theory that takes into ac-
count the degree of relatedness between two agents (Hamilton
1964; Lacy and Sherman 1983; Riolo et al. 2001). While
proximity alone can be an indication of relatedness, being
able to distinguish among heritable tags, as in the armpit
effect (Dawkins 1982; Hauber and Sherman 2000; Hauber et
al. 2000; Mateo and Johnson 2000; Isles et al. 2001), allows
a still better indication of relatedness, for example among
sessile cnidarians (Grosberg and Quinn 1989; Grafen 1990).
The discriminatory abilities required for the armpit effect are
likely to be widespread. The self-recognition required for
multicellularity provides them from intimate contact, and the
need to distinguish conspecifics for mating provides them
more generally for animals. In both cases, a hardwired com-
parison known as the green beard effect (Hamilton 1964;
Dawkins 1976; Haig 1996; Grafen 1998; Keller and Ross
1998) would seriously slow evolution and make speciation
almost impossible.
Viscosity is ubiquitous because few populations complete-
ly mix from one generation to the next. Hamilton (1964)
believed that simple viscosity was a widespread sufficient
cause of fairly weak altruism, and various models have found
that viscosity can indeed foster cooperation (Getty 1987; Pol-
lock 1989; Nowak and May 1992; Nakamaru et al. 1997).
However, this general claim is now considered doubtful. The
balance between increased relatedness and increased com-
petition between neighbors may tilt toward or away from
cooperation (Taylor 1992; Wilson et al. 1992; West et al.
2002). Taylor and Irwin (2000) have suggested that with
overlapping generations, and with altruism dispensed as ben-
efits to fecundity, there is a tendency for population viscosity
to support altruism. The 15.6% cooperation found in our
model with one tag is on the one hand more than zero, sup-
porting Taylor and Irwin, but on the other hand is rather
limited. Adding observable tags shows that proximity can
sustain cooperation based on contingent altruism, even if the
very correlation of tags and relatedness evolves. By putting
both the matching and the altruism under explicit genetic
control, the model shows how altruism conditional on heri-
table tags can evolve despite substantial costs of cooperation.
Thus, the present model, which combines viscosity, the arm-
pit effect, and endogenous use of discrimination in a genet-
ically explicit way, creates a very general expectation of
widespread, and not necessarily weak, conditional altruism
in nature.
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